Category Archives: Civil Rights

Equality and the Constitution

Recently, Virginia became the 38th state to ratify the Equal Rights Amendment.  This vote by the Virginia legislature raises several issues that have only rarely been faced in terms of the text of the Constitution, and there is very little in terms of precedent.  In fact, the closest example might be the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.

There are, of course, some unique features of the Equal Rights Amendment.  Up until 1900, proposed constitutional amendments did not have time limits on ratification.  However,  starting with the Eighteenth Amendment (prohibition) in 1917, four of the nine amendments ratified had time limits.  In addition, two of the three other amendments submitted to the states also had time limits.  In other words, since 1916, half of the proposed constitutional amendments had time limits.  However, until the Equal Rights Amendment was ratified by it’s thirty-eighth state, there has never been a constitutional amendment ratified after the expiration of the time limit for ratification.

It is unclear if Congress has the authority to put a time limit on ratification.  Article V provides  that Congress may propose constitutional amendments (by a two-thirds vote of both houses).  It also gives Congress the power to refer the amendment to state conventions rather than to the state legislatures.  However, it is silent about whether Congress may place a time limit on ratification.  There are, of course, good reasons for having a time limit.  The only remaining pending amendment from the package of amendments that became the Bill of Rights would require one representative for every 50,000 persons in a state.  If adopted, it would instantly expand the House to over 6,000 members.  So there are policy arguments for recognizing the power of Congress to place a time limit on consideration.  On the other hand, a strictly textual argument and the practice of the original congresses would dictate that Congress does not have the policy to impose a time limit. Continue Reading...

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The Argument That Wasn’t — Will the Supreme Court Address Gun Rights This Term?

When I attended law school, the general consensus of legal scholars and the controlling cases held that the Second Amendment protected a “collective” right rather than an individual right.  However, around that time, a movement was starting among conservative interest groups (with some support from conservative scholars) to push the idea that there was an individual aspect to the Second Amendment.  The historical argument on this issue is murky due, in large part, to the way that cases were decided pre-1800.  About a decade ago, conservatives prevailed (by a 5-4 vote) in having the Supreme Court hold that individuals did have some rights under the Second Amendment and that those rights were “incorporated” against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.  However, to get to five votes, the Supreme Court left unaddressed much of the details about the nature of the right protected by the Second Amendment.

Since the Supreme Court issued its two opinions, lower courts have been handling challenges to individual laws restricting the ability to purchase firearms — some involving the type of gun, some involving who can purchase firearms, and some involving other details.  The decisions in these cases have been somewhat narrower than pro-gun activists would like.  They have been hoping to get a case to the Supreme Court so that the Supreme Court could establish the legal test that will be applied in Second Amendment cases.  Earlier this year, conservatives thought that they had found the perfect test case.

Last January, the Supreme Court granted review in New York Rifle and Pistol Association vs. New York, NY.  The case involves a challenge to a New York city ordinance that is very restrictive on where gunowners can take their guns.  (Basically, New York State has two types of permits for gun ownership — one only covers general ownership — sometimes referred to as a target license and sometimes referred to as a premises license — and the other permits carrying a weapon — a carry license.  The New York City ordinance provided that people who only have the general permit can only take their gun out of their in-city home to go to an in-city gun range and could not take them to a second home outside the city or to an out-of-city gun range.)  Seeing the writing on the wall, New York State passed a new gun law that essentially invalidated the New York City ordinance and New York City repealed its ordinance and passed a new one that was significantly less restrictive. Continue Reading...

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Title VII and Sexual Orientation/Gender Identity — Some Thoughts on the Supreme Court Argument

Most summaries of the Supreme Court arguments on the three Title VII cases on sexual orientation/gender identity reflect that the arguments were a rather convoluted mess.  While I have a hunch that we are heading toward a 5-4 decision with the judges splitting on partisan lines, there was enough in the argument to blur the lines as justices seemed to depart from their traditional stances.

One of the big debate in legal fields over the past 100 years is about the theory of “legal realism.”  In oversimplified terms, legal realism contends that judges are just politicians wearing robes and that they decide cases based solely on their policy preferences.  The alternative theory, as expounded by Chief Justice Roberts during his confirmation hearing, is that judges are just umpires calling the balls and strikes based on rules drawn up by others.  In this latter school of thought, judges are trying to interpret the meaning of texts and should not be concerned about the real world consequences of their decisions.

Much of the debate in the ball and strikes theory is about the proper method of interpreting legal texts.  In recent years, conservatives have been big on textualism.  Textualism posits that words in a text have meaning.  If some of the terms are ambiguous, there are rules that can be applied to clarify the text (e.g., by looking at the term in the context of that statute and how that term is used in other similar statutes).  The alternative to textualism is often a reference to legislative history, but — as many statutes were written during a time when liberals had the upper hand in Congress — legislative history (primarily the reports summarizing what a bill was intended to achieve) often supported a more liberal result.  So conservative judges argued that those reports were never actually approved by Congress and that judges should only look at what Congress actually passed — the statutory language itself. Continue Reading...

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Supreme Court Term Preview — October 2019 Term (Part I)

It’s that time of year again.  October 7 is the First Monday in October meaning that the Justices of the United States Supreme Court will be back in D.C. for another term of arguments.  This term is a little bit unusual for recent terms in that — when the Supreme Court had left for the summer — they had already granted review in enough cases to fill the first four (October, November, December, and January) argument sessions.  Recently, the Supreme Court has had trouble granting enough cases to fill the first three argument sessions and have had (at most) one or two cases left over for January when they meet at the end of September to begin adding cases.

(For a little explanation of what I mean about argument sessions and filling them.   From October through April, the Supreme Court has seven argument sessions.  Each session consists of arguments on Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday — excluding any federal or religious holidays.  A “normal” argument day consists of two arguments on two cases.  Ech argument is one hour split evenly between the two-sides although time is often allocated to the Solicitor General to express the government’s position.  Typically, there is a two-week gap between each argument session except for longer breaks after the December and maybe January session.  A Supreme Court case has two rounds of written arguments.  The first round is an application to the Supreme Court to take a case — officially called a petition for writ of certiorari.  These pleadings have relatively short page limits and are designed mostly to explain why the case is important enough for the court to take.  While there are time limits on these pleadings, the Supreme Court is relatively liberal about granting extensions.  If the Supreme Court decides to grant review, there is a second round of written arguments on the merits of the case followed by the oral argument.    The time limits to complete the second round of written arguments is approximately 105 days or 10 days before oral argument whichever is earliest — and extensions are almost unheard of.  Thus, oral argument has to be at least three months after the case is accepted for full briefing and argument — and four is better.  So, any case heard in the first three months has to be accepted before the Supreme Court recesses at the end of June,  And once the Supreme Court returns, any January cases have to be accepted by the end of the October session, etc. until all of the cases for this year’s term have to be accepted by the end of the January session.  Any case accepted after January is for the next year’s term barring an unusual case in which the Supreme Court orders accelerated briefing like what happened last term on the Census case.)

At this point in time, the Supreme Court has issued its argument calendars for the October, November, and December argument sessions.  While it has not yet released the calendar for the January session, it is likely that most of the remaining accepted cases will be heard in January (although some add-ons from cases accepted in October is possible).  Each of the first three parts of this series will focus on one argument session with the fourth part focusing on the cases left over for likely January argument and possible cases that might be granted for the rest of the term.  Any attempt to guess what is likely to be granted is highly speculative.  The Supreme Court accepts about 1% of the cases for actual full review.  Even weeding out the significant amount of long shot petitions, the strongest cases have — at most — a 1 in 10 shot at being granted review. Continue Reading...

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Update on Missouri’s Anti-choice laws

With so-many Republican-controlled states passing laws designed to make abortion illegal, it’s going to be hard over the next several years to track what is happening with each of these laws as they potentially make their way to the Supreme Court.  (And the moderate conservatives are going to try to avoid this issue as long as they can.)  But I can, at least, track what is happening at the local level.

Missouri passed one of these laws this year — House Bill 126,

First, some brief background on Missouri’s legislative process.  Missouri’ legislature meets in an annual session that runs from early January until mid-May (technically, the session ends at the end of May, but all work on legislation must end by mid-May with the last two weeks for the Speaker/President Pro Tempore to sign the official copies of the bills that pass).   The Governor then has until Mid-July to sign or veto the bills (with an earlier deadline for bills passed early in the session).  The Missouri Constitution generally treats an unsigned bill as if the Governor had signed it.  (In other words, the Governor can’t block a bill by leaving it unsigned.)  Generally speaking, new laws take effect on August 28, but — by a  two-thirds vote in both Houses — the legislature can agree that there is an “emergency” for having it take effect at a different time. Continue Reading...

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A Nation of Immigrants

The United States has always been a nation of immigrants.  Except for the very small percentage who can claim to be “pure-blooded” members of one of the Native American tribes, most people have a family tree with roots in immigrants.  And these immigrants came to this country for a variety of reasons — some involuntarily, some for economic reasons, some to escape religious persecution, some to escape ethnic persecution, some to escape political persecution, and some just fleeing political strife (whether internal to a given country or a conflict between countries).  Some of these immigrants came from English-speaking area.  Others came from areas that were not English-speaking and arrived with little, if any, fluency in English.  Many immigrants tended to settle in communities with significant populations from their home regions (and, if they did not arrive with much fluency in English, were able to cope by living in a community in which their native tongue was the predominant language).  Today’s immigrants are no different.

However, other than during the early years of this country (when we desperately needed immigrants to fill the areas otherwise occupied by Native Americans), this country has had a love-hate relationship with new immigrants.  In fact, one of the immediate precursors of the Republican Party was the All-American Party, a political party which was opposed to immigration by Irish Catholics.   Each generation, the undesirable group of immigrants was different, but there were defining characteristics of the anti-immigration sentiment.  First, it was almost always the “new group” of immigrants.  Second, the claim was always that this new group would not fit in and would somehow change the country if we didn’t keep them out.  Third, they were almost always predominately non-Protestant — sometimes Jewish, sometimes Muslim, and all too often Catholic.  So the immigrant haters have moved the target of their hatred from the Irish to the Chinese to Eastern/Southern European to Latin Americans to Indochinese and back to Latin Americans.  (And the shame is that some of the modern supporters of this agenda are the descendants of the earlier targets who are undoubtedly rolling over in their graves at the dishonorable conduct of their descendants.) 

This Fourth of July immigration is at the center of the news again.  On the one hand, we have an administration that sees anti-immigrant hatred as a way of winning elections.   And because immigrants have always tended to flock to urban centers (a/k/a blue areas in today’s politics), they are willing to tamper with the accuracy of the census in the hopes of being able to use an undercount of the immigrant population to stack the deck in redistricting in favor of the Republican Party. Continue Reading...

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Supreme Court and Sexual Orientation

While we wait for the major decisions from this term over the next seven weeks, the Supreme Court has added three cases for next term (likely to be argued in the Fall and decided next Spring) involving sexual orientation and employment.  Two cases involve gay men who allege that they were terminated for being homosexual and one involves a transgender individual who alleges discrimination based on that status.  While at the lower court level, all three claimed, in part, that one of the factors in the employment decision was their failure to comply with gender stereotypes (i.e. they did not conform to the employer’s expectations for male behavior), that claim is only part of the Supreme Court case for the transgender individual.

These cases are going to be difficult for the employees to win, especially the two gay men.  Their claim is statutory, based on Title VII (of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended) which bars discrimination in employment “because of sex.”  And the natural reading of “because of sex” is “because of gender.”  That is the way that the Supreme Court has always read the provision.  And, even today, many states and government agencies use “sex” when they mean gender (e.g., on driver’s licenses and application forms).  The arguments of the employees is hindered by the fact that their claim is statutory rather than constitutional.  Other than the most conservative justices, the justices are somewhat willing to apply constitutional texts and principles to new issues.  Put simply, a constitutional amendment is viewed as an extraordinary thing.  Thus, if a claim is similar enough to existing constitutional protections, courts will sometimes find that it fits under those protections. 

On the other hand, notwithstanding the current problems in Congress, courts tend to see statutory problems as something that the legislature could fix if the legislature wanted to fix the problems.  And Congress has failed to pass proposed legislation that would amend Title VII to include sexual orientation (or create Title VII-type protections against discrimination based on sexual orientation).  Continue Reading...

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The Supreme Court and Redistricting — Again.

Next Monday, the Supreme Court begins its March argument session.  Over the following two weeks, the Supreme Court will hear three case on redistricting.  These cases represent the fifth consecutive year in which the Supreme Court is looking at the rules for redistricting.  While memory is always a tricky thing, I can’t remember a redistricting cycle in which there were these many cases this late in the cycle.  At this point, these cases are more about setting the ground rules for 2021 than getting valid lines for the 2020 election (as, regardless of the decisions in these cases, the lower courts will not have much time to redraw the lines or have those new lines reviewed before 2020).

The session starts on March 18 with another look at the lines for the Virginia House of Delegates.  Two years ago, the Supreme Court found that the trial court applied the wrong standard in considering whether the Republicans in the legislature had improperly considered race in drawing those lines.  On the reconsideration ordered by the Supreme Court, the trial court changed its earlier decision and found that race improperly predominated in the line drawing decisions.  As with earlier cases this cycle, this latest racial gerrymander case involves the fine balancing of the interests of the Voting Rights Act (requiring the State to create majority-minority districts) and the Equal Protection Clause.  The question in these cases ultimately are two questions.  First, whether in the name of creating winnable districts for minorities, the legislature is actually engaged in packing more minorities into the district than is really necessary to meet the requirements of the Voting Rights Act.  Second, whether the districts created are such a departure from the normal districting principles that the lines are clearly the result of a racial gerrymander. 

In previous cases, the Supreme Court has rejected the concept of a one-size-fits-all approach to how many minorities an individual district must have to give minorities the ability to elect the candidate of their choice.  The last time that these districts were in front of the Supreme Court, the majority found that the record showed that the legislature had used such a mechanical rule, drawing the lines so that each of the twelve minority districts had a voting-age population which was at least 55% African-American.  The question on remand (and the issue on appeal) is whether that percentage was appropriate given the history of voting in these area and, assuming that it was not, whether the lines drawn were still appropriate give the other concerns (compactness, contiguity, incumbent protection, existing community lines, etc.) that traditionally govern the redistricting process. Continue Reading...

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Election Law — Supreme Court Edition

While we are still waiting for the decision on the two partisan and one racial gerrymander cases (with less than two weeks to go in the term), we did receive two opinions related to the election process.  The first case — Husted vs. A. Phillip Randolph Institute — was a 5-4 decision on the validity of Ohio’s process for verifying the address of voters and correcting their voter rolls by, in theory removing the voters who had moved or died.  The second case — Minnesota Voters Alliance vs Mansky — was a 7-2 First Amendment case on wearing political apparel into the precinct on election day.

As the close vote indicates, the issue in Husted was more significant and more controversial.  The basic conflict is that federal election law both requires states to take efforts to improve the accuracy of the voter registry and forbids states from removing a voter solely because they did not vote.  Ohio basically has a three-step process:  Step one — not voting in a cycle (a two-year period); Step 2 — a verification notice sent to voters who did not vote in the last cycle; step 3 — not voting in two cycles (a four-year period) after failing to verify their address.   The majority — in an opinion written by Justice Alito — found that the Ohio procedure was consistent with federal law because failure to vote was not the only reason for the removal of the voter.  The main dissent, by Justice Breyer, critiques Step 1.  According to Justice Breyer, Step 2 and Step 3 comply with the “confirmation process” authorized by federal law that states are to use if they believe that a voter may have changed their address.  However, Justice Breyer interprets federal law as requiring that the election authority have a reason — other than the failure to vote — to believe that a voter has moved.  Justice Breyer argues that common sense and census data reveals that Ohio’s method is likely to result in the removal of a significant number of voters who have not changed address.  In a separate dissent, Justice Sotomayor notes that these overly aggressive purges tend to eliminate voters from vulnerable populations — minorities and the poor who already vote infrequently — thereby suppressing their votes.  Even aside from federal law on voter registration, this disparate impact may violate the Equal Protection Clause and Voting Rights Act.   While not discussed in these opinions, my hunch is that Ohio makes no effort at outreach to notify voters that these notices are coming and that they need to respond.  That lack of outreach and simple experience of recent Republican efforts to make voting more difficult confirms Justice Sotomayor’s theory that this law has nothing to do with complying with the federal requirement that states make efforts to improve the accuracy of voter registration information.

Not surprising for a First Amendment case, the majority opinion in Mansky is written by Chief Justice Roberts.  The Minnesota law at issue bans the wearing of political apparel in the polling place.  While finding that polling places are “non-public forums” for the purpose of First Amendment law (meaning that the government can ban speech),  the majority finds a problem with the way that Minnesota has written its law.  The essential problem is that Minnesota law does not define what qualifies as political apparel (unlike many other states with similar laws).   While the state election authority has attempted to give local election authorities some guidance on this issue, even that guidance is somewhat ambiguous.  This lack of clarity was made abundantly clear during the oral argument in Mansky during which the only conclusion that could be drawn about the current state of the law in Minnesota is that the definition of political falls into the “I know it when I see it” category.  Given the broad discretion that the law appears to place in election judges and the lack of clear notice to the voter, the majority found that, as currently written, the law is not reasonable.

With twenty-one opinions left, we are starting to have some idea for every month but February and April as to who might have the opinions.  For October, the only case left is Gill, the Wisconsin partisan gerrymander case, and the only Justice without an opinion is Chief Justice Roberts.  For December, it is likely that Chief Justice Roberts has the only remaining case on court orders for cell phone records.  For January, there are two minor cases left — and Justices Breyer and Kagan are still due an opinion.  There are two problems with projecting February — the Supreme Court dismissed two cases without opinions (meaning that with only seven other cases argued that month, we will not know which two justices originally got those two cases until the last opinion for February is issued); and we still have five cases outstanding.  In March, which only had eight cases to start with, there are two cases left — the California Pregancy Resource (anti-abortion counseling) centers disclosure regulations and the Maryland partisan gerrymander case — and three justices without an opinion — Justices Thomas, Justice Breyer, and Justice Sotomayor.  With both remaining cases likely to be controversial decisions, I can’t see Chief Justice Roberts assigning Justice Thomas to either case (especially the pregnancy resource center case unless Chief Justice Roberts want feminists to be even more riled up at the judiciary).   At this point, I am seeing a good possibility that Justice Breyer is going to get his wish and have re-argument in the fall on the two current partisan gerrymandering cases along with the North Carolina partisan gerrymander case.  If not, I am seeing two narrow opinions that recognize some limited ability to challenge a partisan gerrymander but with different standards than used by either lower court.  Finally, for April, as is typically the case up until the last week of the term, as the most recent month, there are still eight cases to be decided out of twelve cases (three opinion and one tie-vote).  Additionally, since one of the February non-decisions came before the April arguments, it is unclear if one of the justices will get a make-up assignment from the April argument.  (At this point, none of the justices has a full complement of seven opinions — assuming that the three non-opinion cases count toward the full quota, but Justice Ginsburg has six — one from every session but February.  As such, it is more likely than not that any additional opinion — and there should be no more than one such opinion — from Justice Ginsburg will be from the February argument, and we can only pray that it is Janus).

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Sound and Fury Signifying (Almost) Nothing — Masterpiece Cakeshop

I knew when I posted a summary of what cases were left for the term, that there were good chances that the Supreme Court would issue a “stop the presses” opinion today that would be difficult to explain, given how many major cases were left and that several of them had some weird procedural issues.  Well today, we got one of those opinions that everybody was waiting for, and it turned out to be a big dud that ultimately decided nothing other than the individual case.

Masterpiece Cake was one of those cases that seemed to be major.  Earlier this decade, as states began to recognize the right to same-sex marriage and to expand civil rights laws to cover sexual orientation, fundamentalist public interest groups have been seeking to push cases to allow true believers to exempt themselves from generally applicable laws, primarily related to same sex marriage but also to contraception and “morning after” pills.  And eventually, they managed to get the United Supreme Court to accept Masterpiece Cake as the test case for this issue.   The basic issue as presented by the parties was whether the Free Exercise Clause or the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment allows a seller of expressive products to refuse — based on their religious or political beliefs that homosexuality is morally wrong — to provide a product to a same sex couple.  In this case, the product was a cake for a reception celebrating a same sex marriage.  While there was nothing on the cake that expressly endorsed same-sex marriage, the claim was that merely providing the product effectively signaled an endorsement of the marriage.

A problem, however, developed during oral argument.  In Colorado, the initial stage of a civil rights case is a hearing before an administrative body — the Colorado Civil Rights Commission.  During that hearing, one of the members of the Commission committed a gaffe.  In addressing the assertion that the baker should be allowed to discriminate based on a sincere religious belief, one of the commissioners noted that religion had been used to support slavery and the Holocaust.  This statement met all of the classical definitions of a gaffe:  it revealed what the speaker truly thought; as a factual assertion, it was technically defensible (as religion has  been used, and conservative are willing to admit is still true in the case of some Muslims, to support horrendously evil acts); and it is not something that is acceptable to say.    In terms of this case, however, it supported the proposition that the baker did not receive a fair hearing on the issue of whether he should receive some type of exemption from civil rights law based on his religious belief because, at least one member of the Commission, believed that religious beliefs are entitled to no wait whatsoever.

At the end of oral argument, two things were clear.  First, Justice Kennedy — ever the swing vote — wanted a solution that both respected the rights of the same sex couple while not denigrating religious beliefs.  Second, Justice Kennedy had major problems with what the commissioner said during the hearing.   When the Supreme Court issued its opinion,  it was written by Justice Kennedy and, surprise surprise, he managed to focus on the “improper” comments of the commissioners while including face-saving language for both sides that gave only minimal guidance for what lower courts should do in similar cases that are currently pending.

While technically, the vote was 7-2 for the result and six of the seven justices in the majority joined Justice Kennedy’s opinion, when you consider the other opinions, the vote was actually 2-2-3-2.  The core two was Justice Kennedy along with Chief Justice Roberts who did not join any other opinion.  The second two was a concurring opinion written by Justice Kagan for herself and Justice Breyer.  The three was Justice Alito, Justice Gorsuch, and Justice Thomas (who did not join the opinion of the majority) with a concurring opinion written by Justice Gorsuch for himself and Justice Alito and an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment written by Justice Thomas for himself and Justice Gorsuch.  Finally, there was a dissent written by Justice Ginsburg for herself and Justice Sotomayor.

The majority opinion by Justice Kennedy noted that generally applicable laws might defeat any Free Exercise claim but found that the expressed bias of the commissioners hearing the case violated the baker’s due process rights.  In particular, the opinion found that Colorado certainly has the authority to include sexual orientation within the civil rights laws and that, in the absence of a valid claim for exemption, to require individuals to provide goods and services to the LGBT community.  Justice Kennedy took care to emphasize that the comments in question were made by the agency functioning as the trial court on this case during the hearing process — a distinction that may become important in the travel ban case.  In theory, this case will now go back to Colorado for a new hearing in front of the Commission (presumably with different membership given the passage of time since the initial hearing) at which it could reach the same or a different result.

Justice Kagan’s concurring opinion attempts to minimize one fact that played a role in the majority opinion — the different treatment of other bakers who declined to decorate a cake with anti-LGBT messages.  While the majority saw this as evidence of disparate treatment, Justice Kagan saw this distinction as compelled by the civil rights law in issue which banned discrimination based on sexual orientation.  As refusing to engage in discrimination does not violate a law banning discrimination, Justice Kagan found nothing noteworthy in the Commission’s rejection of the frivolous complaints against these other bakers.

Justice Gorsuch’s opinion, while noting the rule that states do not have to create exemptions from generally applicable laws for sincere religious beliefs finds that the disparate treatment of people who support and oppose discrimination means that the law is not generally applicable.  Of course, this claim is logically weak.  All laws reflect some viewpoint of right and wrong.   A law against animal sacrifice is generally applicable despite the fact that it only punishes those who want to engage in animal sacrifice.  Alternatively, Justice Gorsuch suggests that none of the bakers were discriminating based on status but only based on the content of the message put forth by the cake.  Again, this argument ignores that the message that some bakers refused to provide was an express message of bigotry while the message that the baker in this case refused to provide was only his own internal interpretation of an implicit message arising out of the use to which his customer would put his product.

Justice Thomas finds that there is a free speech exception to civil rights laws when the discriminatory conduct is expressive and would find that custom cakes are expressive.

Finally, Justice Ginsburg finds that, regardless of the comments by one commissioner, the full review process removes any taint from the ultimate result.

Because the majority opinion does not reach the ultimate result in this case, it is tough to read the tea leaves for future cases.  There are clearly four votes for the proposition that civil rights laws can ban discrimination even if the would-be discriminators assert that they are acting based on their faith rather than bigotry.  The Chief Justice and Justice Kennedy appear to generally support this proposition while recognizing that there is some exception — at least for ministers being asked to perform a religious service — where the act can only be seen as a religious exercise.  Where exactly the line between these two should be drawn is left for another day.

Three other cases were decided today, leaving twenty-five cases for the last three weeks of the term.

 

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