Tag Archives: gerrymander

The Supreme Court and Redistricting — Again.

Next Monday, the Supreme Court begins its March argument session.  Over the following two weeks, the Supreme Court will hear three case on redistricting.  These cases represent the fifth consecutive year in which the Supreme Court is looking at the rules for redistricting.  While memory is always a tricky thing, I can’t remember a redistricting cycle in which there were these many cases this late in the cycle.  At this point, these cases are more about setting the ground rules for 2021 than getting valid lines for the 2020 election (as, regardless of the decisions in these cases, the lower courts will not have much time to redraw the lines or have those new lines reviewed before 2020).

The session starts on March 18 with another look at the lines for the Virginia House of Delegates.  Two years ago, the Supreme Court found that the trial court applied the wrong standard in considering whether the Republicans in the legislature had improperly considered race in drawing those lines.  On the reconsideration ordered by the Supreme Court, the trial court changed its earlier decision and found that race improperly predominated in the line drawing decisions.  As with earlier cases this cycle, this latest racial gerrymander case involves the fine balancing of the interests of the Voting Rights Act (requiring the State to create majority-minority districts) and the Equal Protection Clause.  The question in these cases ultimately are two questions.  First, whether in the name of creating winnable districts for minorities, the legislature is actually engaged in packing more minorities into the district than is really necessary to meet the requirements of the Voting Rights Act.  Second, whether the districts created are such a departure from the normal districting principles that the lines are clearly the result of a racial gerrymander. 

In previous cases, the Supreme Court has rejected the concept of a one-size-fits-all approach to how many minorities an individual district must have to give minorities the ability to elect the candidate of their choice.  The last time that these districts were in front of the Supreme Court, the majority found that the record showed that the legislature had used such a mechanical rule, drawing the lines so that each of the twelve minority districts had a voting-age population which was at least 55% African-American.  The question on remand (and the issue on appeal) is whether that percentage was appropriate given the history of voting in these area and, assuming that it was not, whether the lines drawn were still appropriate give the other concerns (compactness, contiguity, incumbent protection, existing community lines, etc.) that traditionally govern the redistricting process. Continue Reading...

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June at the Supreme Court — October 2017 Term

Because the Supreme Court has a custom of publishing opinions in the same term as the oral argument on a case and the justices like to wrap up their work before July 4, June is always an active month at the Supreme Court — the legal equivalent of an everything must go closeout sale.  Because during the rest of the year, the Supreme Court issues decisions as the opinions are ready for release, the June opinions reflect two groups of cases.  First, there are the cases from late in the year — March and April primarily — for which a June decision would reflect a somewhat normal opinion pace.  Even for a unanimous decision, it takes time to write an opinion, and sixty days is somewhat the norm even for unanimous opinion.  Second, there are the difficult cases.  While sixty days from argument to opinion is a good pace when everyone agrees, if other justices want to write an opinion (dissenting or concurring) in response to the initial opinion that extends things considerably — particularly if the original author revises their draft to respond to the other opinions as sometimes happens.

This year’s caseload for June is somewhat on the high end for recent years with 29 cases still pending.  (For now the Supreme Court is just issuing cases on Monday, but, at some point this month, the Supreme Court will add additional days each week.  Needing to issue seven cases per week, my hunch is that they will go to two days per week starting June 11, but they might hold off to June 18.)  While there have been other years with more cases still pending at this point in time, what makes this year exceptional is the low number of cases decided.  The Supreme Court only had 63 arguments this year, reflecting the continued decline in accepting cases.  Of those 63 cases, two were dismissed meaning that the Supreme Court has only decided 32 argued cases this year.   As would be expected, the Supreme Court has decided most of the cases from argued between October and January — 28 decisions out of 34 cases.  Of the twenty-nine cases argued in February, March, and April, the Supreme Court has dismissed two cases and decided four cases.  Because the Supreme Court tries to balance out opinion assignments from each argument session, that means that there is some clue as to who is handling the pending cases from the first four argument sessions, but very little clue as to the last three sessions.

From October, there is only one case left and it is bigly important — Gill vs. Whitford on partisan gerrymandering.  Based on the other opinions from October, it appears that Chief Justice Roberts got the initial assignment on the case.  Normally, that would be a bad sign for those who believe that the Supreme Court has some role to play in assuring fair elections.  However, after the initial conference, the Supreme Court did accept a second case on partisan gerrymandering.  I can also see a situation in which the majority saw problems with the standard used by the panel but could not agree on what the standard should be.  That split would allow Chief Justice Roberts to assign the case to himself but could lead to a situation (like the last time that the Supreme Court considered this issue) in which there was no majority opinion.  Or the argument in the second case may have clarified issues resulting in one of the other justices now having the majority opinion.

There are no cases still pending from November, but there are two cases still pending from December.  One case (Carpenter) involves the standard governing government requests for cell phone records (particular those records showing which tower was used by the cell phone which can be used to place a suspect near the crime scene).  The other (Masterpiece Cake) involves whether states have to permit service providers to discriminate based on sexual orientation when the service provider asserts that they have a religious belief implicated by providing the service.  Based on the other opinions issued from the December argument session, it is most likely that these two cases were assigned to Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy.  On the cell phone case, it probably does not matter which justice is writing the opinion.  Both are equally likely to support some solution that includes some protection for suspects but permits the government to obtain those records in most cases.    While both have more often than not voted in favor of protecting free speech and free exercise rights, Justice Kennedy has been much more likely to vote in favor of LGBT rights.  In other words, if Chief Justice Roberts has the opinions, then the baker is very likely to win.  If Justice Kennedy has the opinion, then it could go either way.

The last month in which we can make any decent prediction about opinions is January.  January has three cases remaining (out of nine argued) and three justices do not yet have a January opinion.   The three remaining cases from January have very different significance to non-parties.  One is an original jurisdiction water dispute between Florida and Georgia; one involves whether military judges can both serve on the court that handles military appeals and also on the panel that would hear any appeal if there is ever a trial by the military commission for the inmates at Guantanamo; and one involves the removal of registered voters from the voter roll in Ohio.  The three justices who are likely to have these three cases are Justice Breyer, Justice Alito, and Justice Kagan.  Given that the other water right case from January went to Justice Gorsuch, Justice Kagan (as second most junior) is a good candidate to get the water rights case.   Given the number of significant criminal justice decisions in January (three — with the opinions written by Justice Kennedy, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Sotomayor), I can see how either of these two cases could have been assigned to Justice Breyer or Justice Alito as both involve questions of statutory interpretation.  As with the December opinions, I don’t think it matters to the outcome which justice gets the military appeals opinion.  Given how long it is taking, there is probably a split, but it is not necessarily along liberal-conservative lines and both Justice Breyer and Justice Alito could be in the majority on that case.  The voting case (Husted) is very likely to be a liberal-conservative split with Chief Justice Robert and Justice Kennedy controlling which side won.

For the cases argued in February or later, there is simply not enough information to guess who is writing the opinion.   With the two dismissed cases (out of nine argued) in February, we will not know until we get the opinions who has what case (although we will know who does not have the remaining cases as each opinion gets published).  For now, we just have an opinion from Justice Breyer.  The biggest case remaining from January (Janus) involves the First Amendment and mandatory union dues for public employees.  Given that the current law probably only survived due to the death of Justice Scalia, most people expect that the Supreme Court will strike another blow against unions.  There are some other potentially significant First Amendment cases from February — Mansky on political apparel at polling places, and Lozman  on whether a person can assert a claim of retaliatory arrest for political activity if the arrest would otherwise be legal.

From March, there have been two opinions issued from eight cases argued.  As such, we know that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Gorsuch probably do not have any of the six remaining cases.  Because at least one justice will not have an opinion from March, it will be impossible to predict who has any particular case.  The two major cases from March is the California case on mandatory disclosures by “pregnancy resource centers” and the Maryland partisan gerrymander case.   In the past, the Supreme Court has approved of laws imposing mandatory disclosure requirements of abortion providers, but the California case involves mandatory disclosures from medical and pseudo-medical facilities that are pro-life.  It is likely that some of the disclosures will not survive, and the big issue is whether the Supreme Court will call into question or overrule some of those earlier decisions.  As noted above, the fact that the Supreme Court heard arguments in a second partisan gerrymander case implies that there was not a consensus after the first case.   The big question is whether this second case led to the first case being reassigned to one justice who will write opinions in both cases.   Again, I would not be surprised by the majority finding some flaws with the decisions of the trial court panel, but no opinion getting a majority of justices supporting a particular legal test that governs this type of case.  That leads to one of the minor cases from March (Hughes) in which the Supreme Court is reconsidering the standard that lower courts should use when figuring out the test created when there is no majority opinion in a case.

Lastly, there is April.  April is one of two months (December was the other) in which there were more than nine cases argued.  For April, part of the guessing involves the total cases for the year.  With 63 argued cases, each justice should have gotten seven opinions total for the year.  From October to December, there were twenty-five cases, and it appears that Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice Roberts will only have two cases from the first three months.  Thus, they are likely to have two each from April.  Whichever justice does not have an opinion from March could get the other extra case from April, but we will not know whom that justice is until we get a second opinion from a justice in April or all of the March opinions.  Additionally, we do not know the impact of the two dismissed cases from February.  As they were not immediately dismissed, the cases were probably assigned to a justice (and thus implicitly count toward the seven).

There are several significant cases from April.  Obviously at the top of the list is the Muslim travel ban case.  Also of significance on the immigration issue (Pereira) involves what qualifies as a valid notice to appear (the document served on a deportable immigrant that starts the deportation case) as it impacts whether a legal immigrant has enough time in the United States to qualify for relief from deportation.  While partially a technical issue, Lucia involves whether administrative law judges are “officers” of the United States subject to the appointments clause (Senate confirmation unless other officers are authorized by statute to appoint the “inferior” officer).  Given that the process for appointing most administrative law judges does not comply with the appointments clause, this challenge is a way for regulated parties to basically block administrative enforcement proceedings.  Wayfair is a request by states for the Supreme Court to reconsider its rule on when a state can impose a sales tax on catalog/internet sales.  Finally, Abbot is a racial gerrymander case.

Abbot has been buried a little by the primary focus on partisan gerrymandering, but it involves what could be a significant issue for the next round of redistricting.  When a court finds that it is likely that a redistricting plan is invalid, it can draw an interim plan pending a full hearing on all of the claims (or legislative action fixing the invalid plan).  In drawing the interim plan, particularly as the court has not made a final determination, it is supposed to make the minimal changes necessary to remedy the identified flaws in the original map.  After redistricting in 2011, the district court found problems with the initial plan and adopted an interim plan.  Texas, wanting to keep as much of its original discriminatory plan in place as possible, passed a new map based on the approved interim plan.  Texas now wants to claim that their adoption of the interim plan protects them from any further challenges to its map.   The groups challenging the new maps note the restrictions — both substantive and time — that limit an interim map and argue that, because an interim map is still influenced by the original discriminatory map, they should be able to argue that the interim map did not completely cure the original violation and still reflects an intent to discriminate.  How the court maneuvers between these two positions will influence what happens in the next round of redistricting.

In short, out of twenty-nine cases, there are four voting cases (three redistricting and one registration), two immigration cases, one abortion case, one LGBT rights case, and one major labor case.  The results will have a major influence on voters, women, workers, immigrants, and the LGBT community.

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Supreme Court 2017-18 Term Preview: Part I (October arguments)

It’s mid-September which means that the Supreme Court will soon be returning to Washington for this year’s term.  The Supreme Court, for the most part, controls what cases it will schedule for full briefing and oral argument.  For this fall, the Supreme Court has a total of twenty-eight cases (actually a little more, but several cases have been consolidated) available for argument over seventeen argument days.  They have posted the schedule of cases for October and November with the remaining cases likely to be scheduled for December (although some may be heard in January).  It is unclear if the low number of cases is the product of the time that it took to fill the vacancy on the Supreme Court or is the continuation of the long-term trend under the last three Chief Justices to gradually reduce the number of cases heard.    However, the numbers tend to support the “reducing the docket” theory.  While the January “holdover” cases are slightly low (only three), the number of cases on which the Supreme Court granted review in February and March are close to average.  The real “below average” months are the months after Justice Gorsuch took the bench.

This part will look at the cases currently scheduled for argument in the  “October” session beginning on October 2.  As in past years, I will be focusing mostly on the “political” case, those dealing with elections or with heated public policy issues.  These cases aren’t the entirety of the Supreme Court docket.  A lot of the Supreme Court docket deals with resolving conflicts over the interpretation of interpretation of federal statutes or handling criminal justice issues.  These cases do not get a lot of media attention, but they do matter to the persons impacted by them.

Of the ten cases on the October docket, three deal with immigration issues.  Two of the cases (Dimaya) and (Jennings) are rearguments from last year.  The belief is that these cases were probably 4-4 splits, but that might not be the case for Jennings.

The issue in Dimaya is the constitutionality of part of the definition of who can be deported.  The definition is similar to a provision in the federal criminal code that the Supreme Court has previously found to be unconstitutionally vague.  Hidden in the apparent split is whether the standards for precision in immigration law are less strict than the standards applied to criminal cases.

The second holdover — Jennings — involves bond while deportation hearings are pending.  While the thought is that the reason for the rescheduling is a 4-4 split, there is a second possibility.  The initial briefing and the first argument focused largely on the proper way to interpret the statute (with some consideration of constitutional issues as they impact the interpretation of the statute).  After argument, the Supreme Court requested additional briefing on the constitutionality of the statute.

The new immigration case(s) is the consolidated cases on the Trump travel ban.  Back in June, the Supreme Court allowed a very limited version of the travel ban to go into effect.  (There has been some additional litigation that has narrowed the ban even further.)  One issue that may impact the argument is whether the travel ban is now moot.  By its own terms, the travel ban was for set period of time to give the Trump Administration time to review the process by which visas are granted.  Since the bans are about to expire by their own terms, the Supreme Court could decide that there is no longer a need to determine their validity.

Sharing the opening day with Dimaya is a consolidated trio of cases dealing with union issues.  The issue is whether the National Labor Relations Act (the law governing unions and collective bargaining) bars a collective bargaining agreement from requiring the arbitration of all work-related issues.

There are three other major cases in October.  First, Gill is the next big redistricting case.  The lower court found that the Wisconsin legislature engaged in an illegal partisan gerrymander.  In the past, redistricting cases have mostly focused on racial gerrymander.  The last time that the Supreme Court considered partisan gerrymander, the deciding vote (Justice Kennedy) concluded that, in theory, the Constitution barred partisan gerrymanders but that there was no workable standards for such a case.  The successful plaintiffs (and several activists around the country that have filed supporting briefs) believe that the same computer technology which has made it easier to gerrymander district also can lead to workable standards.

The second case — involving the Department of Defense and the National Association of Manufacturers — involves the “Waters of the United States” rule.  Technically, the issue in front of the Supreme Court is which court has the authority to review the validity of the rule.  Given that conservatives have attacked the rule on the merits (claiming that it vastly and improperly expands federal authority under the Clean Waters Act), however, this decision may get some attention.

The third case (Jesner) deals with corporate liability under the Alien Tort Statute.  The Alien Tort Act allows plaintiffs to sue individual defendants in the United States for acts committed outside the United States that violate “the laws of nations” and is often used in connection with human rights violations.  It is unclear if the statute only reaches bad acts by individuals or also reaches bad acts by corporations.  (In short, despite the sloganeering in the political arena, corporations are not people and are only treated as a “legal” person for some purposes.)  Adding to the controversy is the defendant in this case — the Arab Bank.  The underlying allegation is that the Arab Bank (a Jordanian-based bank with branches all over the world) has allowed itself to be used to funnel money for terrorist purposes.  The plaintiffs seek to hold the bank civilly liable for damages caused by the terrorists who use the Bank to hold money and route payments.  At this stage, the issue is not the merits of the allegation.  It is whether the Alien Tort Statute can be used to bring claims against corporations in U.S. courts (as none of the illegal acts occurred in the U.S.).  This case is not the first time that the Supreme Court has considered this issue.  The last time — involving an oil companies operations in Nigeria — the Supreme Court found a way to resolve that case without reaching the scope of the Alien Tort Act.  Needless to say, multinational corporations have been seeking to have the Supreme Court address this basic issue, preferably in a way that keeps them out of federal court.

As the above summary shows, this year is starting off with a bang.  Seven cases that will probably get some media attention or will impact major issues.   Long term, the most significant is probably Gill.  I will be posting more on Gill either shortly before or shortly after it is argued.  The outcome of Gill will play a major role in what happens in the next round of redistricting in 2021.  (It is probably too late in this cycle to matter much for current districts.  The decision will probably be issued too late for challenges to be resolved before the 2018 elections, leaving only the possibility of some new lines before the 2020 elections.)

 

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Redistricting Advanced Course

We are four years away from the next full round of redistricting.  The redistricting process is a combination of federal law, state law, and local politics.  The fact that there are legal rules governing the process means that individuals who do not like one of the many maps (congressional, state senate, state house, county commission, city council) can bring a court challenge to that map.  When discussing federal law, there are two crucial provisions — the Fourteenth Amendment and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.  (Additionally, there is some suggestion that the First Amendment may have an impact on certain types of gerrymanders.)  This week the Supreme Court issued an opinion on North Carolina’s congressional districts that attempted to reconcile the Fourteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights Acts.

The background of this case is that, two decades ago, the Supreme Court (in a case involving North Carolina) held that a racial gerrymander — one in which race played a significant role in the drawing of the lines — would be subject to strict scrutiny (the most state unfriendly form of review — requiring showing of both a “compelling interest” justifying the use of race and that the use of race was “narrowly tailored” to meet that compelling interest).  Over the years, the Supreme Court has clarified that, to trigger state scrutiny, race must be the predominate factor in drawing the lines.  The Supreme Court has also clarified that Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act can be a compelling interest.

North Carolina currently has three Democratic representatives in Congress — from the 1st district, the 4th district, and the 12th district.  Before the last round of redistricting, African-Americans represented around 48% of the voting age population (BVAP in election law jargon) of the 1st district and 43% of voting age population of the 12th.  That BVAP was enough to make African-Americans into a very significant segment of the Democratic primary vote in those districts and there are enough white Democrats in those districts that — even in bad years nationally, the Democratic candidate gets well over 60% of the vote in those districts.  In short, African-Americans could get their preferred candidate selected in those districts even though they did not have 50% of the vote.  In the trial court, North Carolina conceded that they did take race into account in drawing the 1st district but claimed that they did so to meet Section 2 (that is by making the 1st district into a majority-minority district),  On the 12th district, North Carolina claimed that they did not draw that district to pack it with African-Americans but rather to pack it with Democrats.  However, there was some evidence that — at least for one county in the district — they did expressly consider race and, also, that they used race as a proxy for partisanship.  Additionally, the 12th was already compliant with “one man, one vote” even if North Carolina had kept the old district lines and the changes added mostly African-Americans while removing mostly whites.

The Supreme Court made three crucial rulings in this case:  1) using race as a proxy for partisanship is still using race; 2) there is no particular way that the party claiming a racial gerrymander has to prove the existence of a racial gerrymander (i.e. the party challenging the gerrymander does not have to produce an “alternative” map that closely matches the goals that led to the actual map); 3) there needs to be a substantial reason to believe that the racial gerrymander is necessary to comply with the Voting Rights Act.  In this case, because the history of the districts showed that African-Americans could easily elect their preferred candidate even though the BVAP was not a majority in the district, the Voting Rights Act did not require the conversion of these “opportunity” districts into majority-minority districts.  As such, the lower court decision invalidating the legislatively-drawn districts and drawing a new temporary map (at least until the legislature draws its own new map) was upheld.

A significant feature of this decision is its discussion of “race as party.”  There are currently three basic types of gerrymander noted by election law experts — a racial gerrymander (lines drawn based on race for racial reason), a partisan gerrymander (lines drawn on past partisan performance for partisan reasons), and race as party gerrymander (using racial composition to approximate partisan vote).  This decision rejects any attempt to defend a gerrymander as actually being a race as party rather than racial gerrymander.

There remains the issue of partisan gerrymander.  The last time that the Supreme Court looked at partisan gerrymanders, the Supreme Court issued an ambiguous split decision.  The controlling decision kept open the possibility that such a claim could be raised but found that the challengers failed to propose any usable standard that would permit a court to find that the legislature went too far.  Since that decision, there has been a massive change in data management (of course, not just for redistricting purposes) that both makes it easier for those drawing maps to draw very precise lines to achieve partisan goals and also to measure the partisan impact of those lines.

Last November, in a challenge to Wisconsin’s state legislature, a three-judge panel determined that there was a usable standard for measuring a partisan gerrymander.  More significantly, the panel found that Wisconsin had engaged in a partisan gerrymander and that the lines could not be justified by traditional redistricting goals (e.g., compactness, respecting communities of interest, etc.).

In part, the Wisconsin involves a new statistical analysis.  That analysis (the “efficiency gap” or “EG” ) looks at how many votes are “wasted” — i.e. votes cast for the losing candidate or excess votes (more than 50% plus one) for the winning candidates.  In a close race, the winning party wastes few votes and the losing party wastes a significant number of votes.  In a landslide, the winning party wastes more votes and the losing party, while still wasting a large number of votes, wastes fewer votes than it would in a close race.  The efficiency gap looks at the total number of wasted votes state-wide by subtracting the number of wasted votes that one party has from the number of wasted votes that the other party has and then dividing by the total number of votes cast.  Imagine for an example, a state in which 60 of the districts favored one party by 55-45%  and the remaining 40 favored the other party by 75-25% with 3,000 votes in each district.  In the 60 districts favoring party A, party A wastes 5% of the total vote (150 in each district) and party B wastes 45% of the vote (1350 votes) for a state-wide total of 9,000 wasted votes for party A and 81,000 wasted votes for party B.  In the 40 districts favoring party B, both parties waste 25% of the vote (750 votes) for a state-wide total of 30,000 votes each.  The net is that — out of 300,000 votes statewide, there is an efficiency gap of 72,000 wasted votes for party B or 24% of the total vote in favor of party A.  (Also turning 43% of the state-wide vote total into 60% of the seats.)  The challengers proposed a two-part test for determining if there was a partisan gerrymander:  1) was there an intent to engage in a partisan gerrymander; and 2) does the EG show a significant partisan gerrymander — defined as an EG of 7% or more in favor of that party).  If the challengers can meet both elements, the courts would then shift the burden to  the defenders of the map who could win by showing that the map was the legitimate result of state policy or inevitable given the state’s political geography.  In other words, a state does not have to draw weird lines to overcome the fact that 60% of the state lives in areas where 60% of the voters are Republicans and the other 40% live in areas where 70% of the voters are Democrats.

While not strictly adopting the test proposed by the challengers, the Wisconsin panel did find that EG was a useful device in determining whether a party had proven an intentional partisan gerrymander.  The Wisconsin panel also held that the state had failed to provide sufficient justification for those lines.

Under federal law, the appeal of this decision goes directly to the Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court has three options:  1) affirm without briefing and argument; 2) reverse without briefing and argument; or 3) schedule briefing and argument.  Wisconsin has asked the Supreme Court to reverse without briefing and argument.  If the Supreme Court decides to grant full briefing, Wisconsin has asked for a stay of the panel decision (which requires Wisconsin to draw new lines this year in time for the 2018 elections or the panel will draw their own lines).   As the Supreme Court has never adopted standards governing a partisan gerrymander claim, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court would affirm without full briefing and argument.  We should know by the end of June when the Supreme Court breaks for the summer whether they will grant full briefing and argument on this case (instead of reversing without argument).

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