Tag Archives: Immigration

A Nation of Immigrants

The United States has always been a nation of immigrants.  Except for the very small percentage who can claim to be “pure-blooded” members of one of the Native American tribes, most people have a family tree with roots in immigrants.  And these immigrants came to this country for a variety of reasons — some involuntarily, some for economic reasons, some to escape religious persecution, some to escape ethnic persecution, some to escape political persecution, and some just fleeing political strife (whether internal to a given country or a conflict between countries).  Some of these immigrants came from English-speaking area.  Others came from areas that were not English-speaking and arrived with little, if any, fluency in English.  Many immigrants tended to settle in communities with significant populations from their home regions (and, if they did not arrive with much fluency in English, were able to cope by living in a community in which their native tongue was the predominant language).  Today’s immigrants are no different.

However, other than during the early years of this country (when we desperately needed immigrants to fill the areas otherwise occupied by Native Americans), this country has had a love-hate relationship with new immigrants.  In fact, one of the immediate precursors of the Republican Party was the All-American Party, a political party which was opposed to immigration by Irish Catholics.   Each generation, the undesirable group of immigrants was different, but there were defining characteristics of the anti-immigration sentiment.  First, it was almost always the “new group” of immigrants.  Second, the claim was always that this new group would not fit in and would somehow change the country if we didn’t keep them out.  Third, they were almost always predominately non-Protestant — sometimes Jewish, sometimes Muslim, and all too often Catholic.  So the immigrant haters have moved the target of their hatred from the Irish to the Chinese to Eastern/Southern European to Latin Americans to Indochinese and back to Latin Americans.  (And the shame is that some of the modern supporters of this agenda are the descendants of the earlier targets who are undoubtedly rolling over in their graves at the dishonorable conduct of their descendants.) 

This Fourth of July immigration is at the center of the news again.  On the one hand, we have an administration that sees anti-immigrant hatred as a way of winning elections.   And because immigrants have always tended to flock to urban centers (a/k/a blue areas in today’s politics), they are willing to tamper with the accuracy of the census in the hopes of being able to use an undercount of the immigrant population to stack the deck in redistricting in favor of the Republican Party. Continue Reading...

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Honor and Idiocy

I awoke this morning to two things: Justin Amash has left the Republican Party. Great respect for what he did. Nine more and we won’t all turn to salt.

The second thing was a post on a Facebook feed I normally don’t read. The woman was talking about “Illegal Immigrants”. While working to comprise a response that didn’t include the words “racist” “idiot” “moron” “troll” etc., I flashed back to last summer, when I spoke at an immigration rally.

At that rally, I had the opportunity to use a line I’d formulated in my mind earlier. Of every line in every speech I’ve ever given, it was my favorite. Here it is: Continue Reading...

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The Walk and Chew Gum Agenda

Earlier this week, the petulant child-in-chief stated that Democrats on Capitol Hill can either choose to work on legislative issues or investigate him.  As we have gotten used to over the past several years, President Trump simply does not understand the rules for how government works.  This latest temper tantrum, however, is a challenge to Democrats on Capitol Hill.  It’s important that our leaders show that we can do both and do both in a big way.

Because President Trump can veto any legislation and because Senator Mitch McConnell is best at blocking legislation and lousy at getting anything done, it is unlikely that Democrats can actually get any significant laws passed until after the 2020 election.  But Democrats can make a big deal of the House passing a set of laws that will be the core of the legislative agenda in 2021. 

On infrastructure, the appropriate committee needs to draft a bill that will make a major down payment on the backlog of crucial infrastructure projects.  And then, the Rules committee can set aside a healthy block of time to debate that bill on the floor of the House.  During that debate, Democrats from every swing state and swing district can speak about what that bill will mean for their area — the type of speeches which can be blasted on you tube with highlights on the local news.  Then Democratic Senators can regularly ask when Mitch McConnell will let that bill come up for a vote in the Senate. Continue Reading...

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The Supreme Court and the Census

If you have been a follower of this site since the beginning, you know that we think that the Census and redistricting are very big things.  Getting an accurate count and fair lines tends to help the Democrats win elections. 

At the same time, we have also been big followers of the Supreme Court.  For good or evil, both sides of the political spectrum have learned that, if you lose the battle in Congress or with an executive agency, you can turn to the courts to continue the battle.  And many of these fights ultimately get decided by the Supreme Court.

By the time that this posts, we will be at the end of the first week of the last argument session of the October 2018 Term.   (For brief explanation of argument sessions and review process, see appendix.)  On Tuesday of next week, the United States Supreme Court will hear a case that combines our focus on the Supreme Court and our focus on the Census — U.S. Department of Commerce vs. New York Continue Reading...

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June at the Supreme Court — October 2017 Term

Because the Supreme Court has a custom of publishing opinions in the same term as the oral argument on a case and the justices like to wrap up their work before July 4, June is always an active month at the Supreme Court — the legal equivalent of an everything must go closeout sale.  Because during the rest of the year, the Supreme Court issues decisions as the opinions are ready for release, the June opinions reflect two groups of cases.  First, there are the cases from late in the year — March and April primarily — for which a June decision would reflect a somewhat normal opinion pace.  Even for a unanimous decision, it takes time to write an opinion, and sixty days is somewhat the norm even for unanimous opinion.  Second, there are the difficult cases.  While sixty days from argument to opinion is a good pace when everyone agrees, if other justices want to write an opinion (dissenting or concurring) in response to the initial opinion that extends things considerably — particularly if the original author revises their draft to respond to the other opinions as sometimes happens.

This year’s caseload for June is somewhat on the high end for recent years with 29 cases still pending.  (For now the Supreme Court is just issuing cases on Monday, but, at some point this month, the Supreme Court will add additional days each week.  Needing to issue seven cases per week, my hunch is that they will go to two days per week starting June 11, but they might hold off to June 18.)  While there have been other years with more cases still pending at this point in time, what makes this year exceptional is the low number of cases decided.  The Supreme Court only had 63 arguments this year, reflecting the continued decline in accepting cases.  Of those 63 cases, two were dismissed meaning that the Supreme Court has only decided 32 argued cases this year.   As would be expected, the Supreme Court has decided most of the cases from argued between October and January — 28 decisions out of 34 cases.  Of the twenty-nine cases argued in February, March, and April, the Supreme Court has dismissed two cases and decided four cases.  Because the Supreme Court tries to balance out opinion assignments from each argument session, that means that there is some clue as to who is handling the pending cases from the first four argument sessions, but very little clue as to the last three sessions.

From October, there is only one case left and it is bigly important — Gill vs. Whitford on partisan gerrymandering.  Based on the other opinions from October, it appears that Chief Justice Roberts got the initial assignment on the case.  Normally, that would be a bad sign for those who believe that the Supreme Court has some role to play in assuring fair elections.  However, after the initial conference, the Supreme Court did accept a second case on partisan gerrymandering.  I can also see a situation in which the majority saw problems with the standard used by the panel but could not agree on what the standard should be.  That split would allow Chief Justice Roberts to assign the case to himself but could lead to a situation (like the last time that the Supreme Court considered this issue) in which there was no majority opinion.  Or the argument in the second case may have clarified issues resulting in one of the other justices now having the majority opinion.

There are no cases still pending from November, but there are two cases still pending from December.  One case (Carpenter) involves the standard governing government requests for cell phone records (particular those records showing which tower was used by the cell phone which can be used to place a suspect near the crime scene).  The other (Masterpiece Cake) involves whether states have to permit service providers to discriminate based on sexual orientation when the service provider asserts that they have a religious belief implicated by providing the service.  Based on the other opinions issued from the December argument session, it is most likely that these two cases were assigned to Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy.  On the cell phone case, it probably does not matter which justice is writing the opinion.  Both are equally likely to support some solution that includes some protection for suspects but permits the government to obtain those records in most cases.    While both have more often than not voted in favor of protecting free speech and free exercise rights, Justice Kennedy has been much more likely to vote in favor of LGBT rights.  In other words, if Chief Justice Roberts has the opinions, then the baker is very likely to win.  If Justice Kennedy has the opinion, then it could go either way.

The last month in which we can make any decent prediction about opinions is January.  January has three cases remaining (out of nine argued) and three justices do not yet have a January opinion.   The three remaining cases from January have very different significance to non-parties.  One is an original jurisdiction water dispute between Florida and Georgia; one involves whether military judges can both serve on the court that handles military appeals and also on the panel that would hear any appeal if there is ever a trial by the military commission for the inmates at Guantanamo; and one involves the removal of registered voters from the voter roll in Ohio.  The three justices who are likely to have these three cases are Justice Breyer, Justice Alito, and Justice Kagan.  Given that the other water right case from January went to Justice Gorsuch, Justice Kagan (as second most junior) is a good candidate to get the water rights case.   Given the number of significant criminal justice decisions in January (three — with the opinions written by Justice Kennedy, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Sotomayor), I can see how either of these two cases could have been assigned to Justice Breyer or Justice Alito as both involve questions of statutory interpretation.  As with the December opinions, I don’t think it matters to the outcome which justice gets the military appeals opinion.  Given how long it is taking, there is probably a split, but it is not necessarily along liberal-conservative lines and both Justice Breyer and Justice Alito could be in the majority on that case.  The voting case (Husted) is very likely to be a liberal-conservative split with Chief Justice Robert and Justice Kennedy controlling which side won.

For the cases argued in February or later, there is simply not enough information to guess who is writing the opinion.   With the two dismissed cases (out of nine argued) in February, we will not know until we get the opinions who has what case (although we will know who does not have the remaining cases as each opinion gets published).  For now, we just have an opinion from Justice Breyer.  The biggest case remaining from January (Janus) involves the First Amendment and mandatory union dues for public employees.  Given that the current law probably only survived due to the death of Justice Scalia, most people expect that the Supreme Court will strike another blow against unions.  There are some other potentially significant First Amendment cases from February — Mansky on political apparel at polling places, and Lozman  on whether a person can assert a claim of retaliatory arrest for political activity if the arrest would otherwise be legal.

From March, there have been two opinions issued from eight cases argued.  As such, we know that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Gorsuch probably do not have any of the six remaining cases.  Because at least one justice will not have an opinion from March, it will be impossible to predict who has any particular case.  The two major cases from March is the California case on mandatory disclosures by “pregnancy resource centers” and the Maryland partisan gerrymander case.   In the past, the Supreme Court has approved of laws imposing mandatory disclosure requirements of abortion providers, but the California case involves mandatory disclosures from medical and pseudo-medical facilities that are pro-life.  It is likely that some of the disclosures will not survive, and the big issue is whether the Supreme Court will call into question or overrule some of those earlier decisions.  As noted above, the fact that the Supreme Court heard arguments in a second partisan gerrymander case implies that there was not a consensus after the first case.   The big question is whether this second case led to the first case being reassigned to one justice who will write opinions in both cases.   Again, I would not be surprised by the majority finding some flaws with the decisions of the trial court panel, but no opinion getting a majority of justices supporting a particular legal test that governs this type of case.  That leads to one of the minor cases from March (Hughes) in which the Supreme Court is reconsidering the standard that lower courts should use when figuring out the test created when there is no majority opinion in a case.

Lastly, there is April.  April is one of two months (December was the other) in which there were more than nine cases argued.  For April, part of the guessing involves the total cases for the year.  With 63 argued cases, each justice should have gotten seven opinions total for the year.  From October to December, there were twenty-five cases, and it appears that Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice Roberts will only have two cases from the first three months.  Thus, they are likely to have two each from April.  Whichever justice does not have an opinion from March could get the other extra case from April, but we will not know whom that justice is until we get a second opinion from a justice in April or all of the March opinions.  Additionally, we do not know the impact of the two dismissed cases from February.  As they were not immediately dismissed, the cases were probably assigned to a justice (and thus implicitly count toward the seven).

There are several significant cases from April.  Obviously at the top of the list is the Muslim travel ban case.  Also of significance on the immigration issue (Pereira) involves what qualifies as a valid notice to appear (the document served on a deportable immigrant that starts the deportation case) as it impacts whether a legal immigrant has enough time in the United States to qualify for relief from deportation.  While partially a technical issue, Lucia involves whether administrative law judges are “officers” of the United States subject to the appointments clause (Senate confirmation unless other officers are authorized by statute to appoint the “inferior” officer).  Given that the process for appointing most administrative law judges does not comply with the appointments clause, this challenge is a way for regulated parties to basically block administrative enforcement proceedings.  Wayfair is a request by states for the Supreme Court to reconsider its rule on when a state can impose a sales tax on catalog/internet sales.  Finally, Abbot is a racial gerrymander case.

Abbot has been buried a little by the primary focus on partisan gerrymandering, but it involves what could be a significant issue for the next round of redistricting.  When a court finds that it is likely that a redistricting plan is invalid, it can draw an interim plan pending a full hearing on all of the claims (or legislative action fixing the invalid plan).  In drawing the interim plan, particularly as the court has not made a final determination, it is supposed to make the minimal changes necessary to remedy the identified flaws in the original map.  After redistricting in 2011, the district court found problems with the initial plan and adopted an interim plan.  Texas, wanting to keep as much of its original discriminatory plan in place as possible, passed a new map based on the approved interim plan.  Texas now wants to claim that their adoption of the interim plan protects them from any further challenges to its map.   The groups challenging the new maps note the restrictions — both substantive and time — that limit an interim map and argue that, because an interim map is still influenced by the original discriminatory map, they should be able to argue that the interim map did not completely cure the original violation and still reflects an intent to discriminate.  How the court maneuvers between these two positions will influence what happens in the next round of redistricting.

In short, out of twenty-nine cases, there are four voting cases (three redistricting and one registration), two immigration cases, one abortion case, one LGBT rights case, and one major labor case.  The results will have a major influence on voters, women, workers, immigrants, and the LGBT community.

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The Muslim Ban Case

Wednesday is the last argument day of this year’s Supreme Court term, and the Supreme Court is going out with a really big case — Trump vs. Hawaii on immigration ban, version 3.0.  The significance and public interest in this case is revealed by the fact that the audio from the argument will be released later in the day.  (Usually, on argument days, the Supreme Court only releases the transcript with the audios from all arguments in a week being released on Friday.)

From the first day in office, President Trump has been attempting to ban immigration from certain predominately Muslim countries.  Version 1.0 was a rushed order that got into legal trouble quickly.  Version 2.0 reflected the administration taking the time to actually think about the terms of the order.  Version 2.0 expressly established a time frame for studying problems with the visa system and identifying which countries were problematic.  Version 3.0 placed restrictions on immigration from six Muslim countries (Chad, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen) and two non-Muslim countries (North Korea and Venezuela).  According to Version 3.0, these eight countries do not adequately assist the United States in terms of sharing information on the background of visa applicants.

There are two side issues in this case.  The first issue is the question of whether the case is “justiciable.”  In plain English, whether a court can review the President’s exercise of executive power related to immigration.  Generally speaking, individual visa decisions are not reviewable, but this case involves a broader policy.  The other side issue is the question of “global injunctions.”  In plain English, typically, a judge can only issue an order that resolves the claims of the parties to the case.  There is an exception for class actions in which one plaintiff is a representative of a larger group of plaintiffs, but, in a class action, all members of the class are parties to the case and have a right to have input on any settlement.  Recently, there have been several cases — both under the Obama Administration and now under the Trump Administration — in which a judge has issued an injunction that covers the precludes the government from applying a new policy to anybody, not just the individual plaintiffs.

Assuming that the Supreme Court gets past the two side issues, the primary “merits” issue is statutory — what powers do the immigration statutes give to the President.  In particular, the main statute at issue gives the President the power to deny visas to immigrants and classes of immigrants who are potentially dangerous.   The ultimate issue in this case is whether residents of a particular country can qualify as a class, particularly in light of other immigrations statutes barring discrimination based upon nationality.  Even if it does, a secondary issue would be whether the difficulty in verifying details about immigrants from certain countries permits the conclusion that those immigrants are a danger to the United States.  Additionally, the Trump Administration has argued that the President also has some inherent authority in the immigration context beyond the powers delegated by Congress in the administration statutes.

The challengers also raise a constitutional issue.  Assuming that the President can restrict the issuance of visas based on nationality, is the executive order a “Muslim Ban” that would violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?  While the Supreme Court added this issue at the request of the challengers, both the trial court and the Ninth Circuit declined to reach this issue having found that Version 3.0 was invalid under the statutory analysis.  In prior versions of the travel ban cases, courts have considered the President’s public statements about putting in place a Muslim ban as proof that Version 3.0 was the product of religious animus and an intent to discriminate against Muslims.  More likely than not, the Supreme Court will not reach this issue.  Assuming that the Supreme Court reaches the merits, if the Supreme Court finds that the travel ban is authorized by statute or the President’s inherent authority, the Supreme Court will remand this issue back to the lower courts to make factual findings.

As with other appellate cases, it is rare for there to be an instant decision.  Instead, an opinion will be released later this term.  Given the fact that this case is the last to be argued, it is most likely that the opinion in the case will be issued in late June, just before the Supreme Court recesses for the summer.  While it is still too early to predict with any degree of confidence the exact date that the Supreme Court will issue its last opinion, the current schedule has the Supreme Court recessing during the week of June 25 which is consistent with its usual practice (recessing before July 4).  (The last four years, the Supreme Court has finished issuing opinions on that last Monday in June, but, in prior years, it has issued some opinions later in that last week of June.)

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Supreme Court 2017-18 Term Preview: Part I (October arguments)

It’s mid-September which means that the Supreme Court will soon be returning to Washington for this year’s term.  The Supreme Court, for the most part, controls what cases it will schedule for full briefing and oral argument.  For this fall, the Supreme Court has a total of twenty-eight cases (actually a little more, but several cases have been consolidated) available for argument over seventeen argument days.  They have posted the schedule of cases for October and November with the remaining cases likely to be scheduled for December (although some may be heard in January).  It is unclear if the low number of cases is the product of the time that it took to fill the vacancy on the Supreme Court or is the continuation of the long-term trend under the last three Chief Justices to gradually reduce the number of cases heard.    However, the numbers tend to support the “reducing the docket” theory.  While the January “holdover” cases are slightly low (only three), the number of cases on which the Supreme Court granted review in February and March are close to average.  The real “below average” months are the months after Justice Gorsuch took the bench.

This part will look at the cases currently scheduled for argument in the  “October” session beginning on October 2.  As in past years, I will be focusing mostly on the “political” case, those dealing with elections or with heated public policy issues.  These cases aren’t the entirety of the Supreme Court docket.  A lot of the Supreme Court docket deals with resolving conflicts over the interpretation of interpretation of federal statutes or handling criminal justice issues.  These cases do not get a lot of media attention, but they do matter to the persons impacted by them.

Of the ten cases on the October docket, three deal with immigration issues.  Two of the cases (Dimaya) and (Jennings) are rearguments from last year.  The belief is that these cases were probably 4-4 splits, but that might not be the case for Jennings.

The issue in Dimaya is the constitutionality of part of the definition of who can be deported.  The definition is similar to a provision in the federal criminal code that the Supreme Court has previously found to be unconstitutionally vague.  Hidden in the apparent split is whether the standards for precision in immigration law are less strict than the standards applied to criminal cases.

The second holdover — Jennings — involves bond while deportation hearings are pending.  While the thought is that the reason for the rescheduling is a 4-4 split, there is a second possibility.  The initial briefing and the first argument focused largely on the proper way to interpret the statute (with some consideration of constitutional issues as they impact the interpretation of the statute).  After argument, the Supreme Court requested additional briefing on the constitutionality of the statute.

The new immigration case(s) is the consolidated cases on the Trump travel ban.  Back in June, the Supreme Court allowed a very limited version of the travel ban to go into effect.  (There has been some additional litigation that has narrowed the ban even further.)  One issue that may impact the argument is whether the travel ban is now moot.  By its own terms, the travel ban was for set period of time to give the Trump Administration time to review the process by which visas are granted.  Since the bans are about to expire by their own terms, the Supreme Court could decide that there is no longer a need to determine their validity.

Sharing the opening day with Dimaya is a consolidated trio of cases dealing with union issues.  The issue is whether the National Labor Relations Act (the law governing unions and collective bargaining) bars a collective bargaining agreement from requiring the arbitration of all work-related issues.

There are three other major cases in October.  First, Gill is the next big redistricting case.  The lower court found that the Wisconsin legislature engaged in an illegal partisan gerrymander.  In the past, redistricting cases have mostly focused on racial gerrymander.  The last time that the Supreme Court considered partisan gerrymander, the deciding vote (Justice Kennedy) concluded that, in theory, the Constitution barred partisan gerrymanders but that there was no workable standards for such a case.  The successful plaintiffs (and several activists around the country that have filed supporting briefs) believe that the same computer technology which has made it easier to gerrymander district also can lead to workable standards.

The second case — involving the Department of Defense and the National Association of Manufacturers — involves the “Waters of the United States” rule.  Technically, the issue in front of the Supreme Court is which court has the authority to review the validity of the rule.  Given that conservatives have attacked the rule on the merits (claiming that it vastly and improperly expands federal authority under the Clean Waters Act), however, this decision may get some attention.

The third case (Jesner) deals with corporate liability under the Alien Tort Statute.  The Alien Tort Act allows plaintiffs to sue individual defendants in the United States for acts committed outside the United States that violate “the laws of nations” and is often used in connection with human rights violations.  It is unclear if the statute only reaches bad acts by individuals or also reaches bad acts by corporations.  (In short, despite the sloganeering in the political arena, corporations are not people and are only treated as a “legal” person for some purposes.)  Adding to the controversy is the defendant in this case — the Arab Bank.  The underlying allegation is that the Arab Bank (a Jordanian-based bank with branches all over the world) has allowed itself to be used to funnel money for terrorist purposes.  The plaintiffs seek to hold the bank civilly liable for damages caused by the terrorists who use the Bank to hold money and route payments.  At this stage, the issue is not the merits of the allegation.  It is whether the Alien Tort Statute can be used to bring claims against corporations in U.S. courts (as none of the illegal acts occurred in the U.S.).  This case is not the first time that the Supreme Court has considered this issue.  The last time — involving an oil companies operations in Nigeria — the Supreme Court found a way to resolve that case without reaching the scope of the Alien Tort Act.  Needless to say, multinational corporations have been seeking to have the Supreme Court address this basic issue, preferably in a way that keeps them out of federal court.

As the above summary shows, this year is starting off with a bang.  Seven cases that will probably get some media attention or will impact major issues.   Long term, the most significant is probably Gill.  I will be posting more on Gill either shortly before or shortly after it is argued.  The outcome of Gill will play a major role in what happens in the next round of redistricting in 2021.  (It is probably too late in this cycle to matter much for current districts.  The decision will probably be issued too late for challenges to be resolved before the 2018 elections, leaving only the possibility of some new lines before the 2020 elections.)

 

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The Supreme Court and Immigration

The Statue of Liberty stands as a symbol that this nation was built on immigration.  This past term (and apparently this upcoming term) immigration was a significant part of the Supreme Court docket.  Of the eight cases involving immigration or the border, the Supreme Court issued decisions in five, sent one back to the lower courts (in light of one of the four decisions), and set two for re-argument in the fall (as both were argued before Justice Gorsuch joined the bench, the implication is that there was a 4-4 split or that the majority lacked a consensus on the legal theory for the result).  In addition, the Supreme Court is going to hear argument on the travel ban.

Going in chronological order, at the end of May, the Supreme Court issued a decision on the crimes that trigger deportation — narrowly interpreting the statute to limit the state offenses that trigger deportation.  The decision involved charges of sexual abuse against minors with the court defining minor as under 16 and requiring that the state offense be limited to minors under sixteen.  On the cases that were decided, as discussed in an earlier post, the Supreme Court struck down the law governing birth citizenship when a child is born abroad to parents with split citizenship (i.e. one is a U.S. citizen and the other is not) because the law discriminated based on the gender of the U.S. citizen.

In the next to last week of the term, the Supreme Court issued three more decisions.  The first case — involving a challenge to immigrants arrested after 9/11 — technically was not about immigration but about the right to sue the government and government official for civil rights violations.  While there is a federal statute authorizing individuals to sue state officials, there is no such statute for civil rights violations by federal officials.  While the Supreme Court has authorized such suits in a limited number of circumstances, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to expand that right.  The Supreme Court found that the claim in the most recent case were not similar to the previously recognized claims and decided that it was up to Congress to decide whether to enact a statute authorizing such claims.  That decision also led to the decision to send the second civil rights case (involving a cross-border shooting) back to the lower court to review whether it was the type of claim that could be brought.  (The lower court had originally decided the case on the issue of whether it was a civil rights violation.  In sending the case back, the Supreme Court raised doubts about some of that reasoning.)

The other two decided cases were both criminal cases.  One involved fraud in connection with the citizenship application.  In that case, the Supreme Court found that the fraud or misstatement had to be relevant to the application or the review of the application.  The other case involved erroneous legal advice as to whether accepting the plea offer would trigger deportation.  (The plea offense did require deportation but counsel told his client that it did not.)  The Supreme Court held that, regardless of the strength of the government’s case, a defendant could withdraw his plea if he actually based his plea decision on whether or not he would be deported.  In both cases, the defendants are still looking at likely convictions and deportations.  The false statement in the citizenship application was that the applicant’s husband was likely to be persecuted in Bosnia as he was trying to avoid being forced to fight on behalf of one of the factions when, in fact, her husband had fought for one of the factions and potentially committed war crimes.  In the other case, as the phrasing of the issue indicates, the evidence that the defendant committed the offense (a drug charge) was very strong and — unless he gets a better plea offer — he will probably lose at trial and still get deported.

The two cases rescheduled for next term both involve deportation.  One involves the issue of bond on someone facing deportation.  As any attorney involved in criminal cases knows, bond changes everything in a criminal case.  Somebody who can’t post bond is more likely to look for a quick resolution of the case (either to get released on probation or to go to prison where the conditions tend to be better than in county jails).  On the other hand, somebody on bond is more likely to be happy with delaying the case.  The original briefing and argument focused on statutory interpretation (mostly the doctrine that a statute should be interpreted to avoid potential issues of constitutionality), but — after the argument — the Supreme Court asked for additional briefing on whether the statute was unconstitutional.  The other case involves the deportation statute.  That statute contains a “residual” clause designed to catch state offenses that are similar to the listed offenses.  A similar clause in a criminal statute was struck down because it was too vague.  The issue is whether the vagueness of the definition also requires striking down the clause in the immigration statute.

And that leaves the big case of the week — the travel ban.  To me the interesting thing about the opinion modifying the travel ban are two terms not emphasized in the opinion — standing & class-action.  Standing is a limitation on who can sue.  To have standing, a person must actually be injured by the policy challenged and have a remedy that can cure that injury.  A class-action is a type of lawsuit in which one person can raise a challenge as a representative of a larger group that is suffering the same injury.

While not mentioning these two terms, they seem to be motivating the partial stay of the injunction.  The parties who brought these cases are individuals with relatives seeking visas and governments asserting, in part, the interests of public universities in relation to admitted students and those hired to teach at the universities.  The opinion recognizes that these claims are legitimate and that the lower courts could grant temporary injunctions to protect the interests of these individuals and universities.  It also recognized that the lower court could grant temporary injunctions to cover visa applicants in the same situation as the relatives and employees of the parties bringing the case.  The Supreme Court, however, found that the injunction was overbroad in connection with applicants that did not have close relatives in the U.S. or some other “bona fide” connection to somebody in the United States (whether a school or an employer or something similar.)

There were three justices who would have stayed the entire injunction — Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch.  There opinion suffers from two flaws that are not unusual in this situation.  First, they confuse the requirements for a temporary injunction with the requirements for a permanent injunction with the requirements for a stay of the injunction.  At the temporary injunction stage, the applicant seeking an injunction must show a reasonable probability that they will prevail at the permanent injunction stage, not that they will win.  By definition that means that there is often a reasonable probability that the applicant will lose at the permanent injunction stage.  The fact that the argument behind the temporary injunction is debatable (and potentially wrong) does not by itself mean that the stay should be lifted if the harm caused by lifting the stay (the exclusion of people with a legitimate claim for entry) outweighs the benefits (an unsupported and false claim of national security).

There are two issues raised by the opinions in the travel ban case.  First, the Supreme Court has requested that the briefing address mootness.  By its plain terms, the ban part of the executive order will expire before or shortly after argument in this case which would normally make the case moot — i.e. the decision would have no impact.  While there is an exception to mootness if a case is important enough that might apply to this case, this could be a way for the Supreme Court to punt the case.  Second, while we only have one month of arguments and several opinions on order, Justice Gorsuch seems to be lining up between Justice Alito and Justice Thomas — i.e. on the far right and approaching the loony right.  If this tendency continues, a lot of people will be worse off than they should have been thanks to Senator McConnell’s obstruction of the Merrick Garland nomination last year and the results of the 2016 election.

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Supreme Court 2016-17-Two Weeks Left

One of the unwritten rules of the Supreme Court is that, come hell or high water, the justices will get all of the opinions issued before the July 4th weekend.  (In the past, some justices actually maintained a summer home outside of D.C. and those justices were very keen on getting out of D.C. as soon as possible.  Even today, justices will spend a good part of the summer elsewhere giving presentations and lectures for various schools and groups.)  That will make for a very packed last two weeks.  It’s not just that the number of remaining opinions is slightly high, but the number is high after a very light term.  For the past decade or so, the Supreme Court has heard between 70 and 86 cases per term.  This year, they have only heard 64 cases.  The last two weeks of the terms have seen the court issuing between 9 and 17 opinions.  This year, we still have 17 cases waiting for opinions.  (The pace of grants of argument for the upcoming term is also a little light with 19 cases granted so far which would only take the Supreme Court through November but there tends to be a decent number of cases granted during the last two weeks of the term when the Justices run out of time to postpone making the decision to grant or deny argument in a case.)

Given the large number of cases, it is more likely than not that there will be multiple opinion dates during these two weeks.  In theory, all of the opinions could be issued on one day in each week — the decision on which opinions are final and ready to issue is made at the weekly conference (June 15 and June 22).  But last second “non-substantive” edits that delays the Court’s printshop from having all of  the opinions printed and the sheer number of opinions tends to result in multiple opinion days during this point of the term.  (In addition to the two regular conferences, there is always a wrap-up conference after the last opinion issues.  In the past, the wrap-up conference typically featured cases that had been “held” because they involved an issue raised in one of the argued cases.  Once the argued case has resolved the issue, the held cases can be sent back to the lower court — if necessary — to apply the ruling in the argued case.  In recent years, the practice of taking at discussing cases at two or more conferences before granting argument means that the wrap-up conference involves a final decision on several pending applications.)

As noted in past years, the Supreme Court has customs regarding the assignment of opinions that makes it somewhat possible to predict what Justice is most likely to have which opinion by this point of the term.  Of course, the number of outstanding opinions does make it a little bit harder this year.  The general rule of thumb is that the Supreme Court tries to keep the workload balanced.  With eight justices for the first six months of the term, that usually means that: 1) in any month with seven or fewer cases, no justice gets two opinions, and some justices do not have any opinions; 2) in any month with eight cases, each justice gets one opinion; and 3) in any month with nine or more cases, each justice gets at least one opinion, but no justice gets more than two opinions.  Additionally, this practice means that a justice who was skipped one month is likely to get two opinions in a following month and a justice who had two opinions in one month is likely to get skipped in a following month.  At this point, we do not know whether Justice Gorsuch will be getting one or two opinions from April (we already have one opinion from Justice Gorsuch).  If Justice Gorsuch only has one opinion, seven of the other justices will eight opinions and one will have seven opinions.  If Justice Gorsuch has two opinions, six of the other justices will have eight opinions and two will have seven opinions.  The two justices most likely to have only seven opinions would be the two junior justices — Justice Sotomayor and Justice Kagan — but there is always the possibility that the Chief might decide to count a complicated case as a two-fer to spread the burden of opinion-writing around.

Right now there is one case still outstanding from December — Jennings involving the federal statute on bonds in deportation cases.  Neither Chief Justice Roberts nor Justice Alito have issued an opinion from December.  Looking at the bigger picture, there were thirty-three cases heard between October and January.  Chief Justice Roberts has four opinions from that time frame (picking up two in one of the nine-case months) and Justice Alito currently only has two.  Given that Justice Breyer has five opinions from that time frame (leaving twenty-eight cases for the remaining justices or four per justice), it seems more likely that Justice Alito has the opinion in Jennings.  Given post-argument orders in this case, my projection is that the detainees will receive some type of bond hearings but not as much as the Ninth Circuit had granted.  There is also a significant possibility that the Supreme Court will order re-argument in light of that supplemental briefing and the addition of Justice Gorsuch since the argument.

There are still three cases outstanding from January.  The biggest of the three is Lee involving whether the First Amendment bars the Patent Office from denying trademarks based on the offensive content of the trademark (here an Asian-American band calling themselves “The Slants,” but in another pending case a group of wealthy, mostly white males, calling their sports team “The Redskins”).  There are also the cases about the vagueness of one of the categories of individuals eligible for deportation (i.e. it is allegedly unclear on which criminal offenses qualify) and a civil rights case about the post 9-11 arrests of Muslims.  The three justices who do not yet have a January opinion (and thus should have these cases) are Justice Kennedy, Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito.  More likely than not Justice Kennedy has the trademark/First Amendment case and Justice Thomas has the immigration case, but they could be flipped.

In February, there are two cases outstanding.  One involves a cross border shooting by the border patrol and the other involves the First Amendment and internet restrictions on a sex offender.  Three justices do not have any opinion from February — Justice Breyer, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Alito.  Given that Breyer already has five opinions from October through November and that all justices should be evened up at five opinions per justice through the February sitting, it is more likely than not that these cases have gone to Justice Kennedy and Justice Alito.  The cross-border shooting may be a four-four tie and be scheduled for re-argument.  If not, my hunch is that Justice Kennedy has the cross-border shooting case and Justice Alito has the First Amendment case.

March and April are the problem months for predicting (eleven cases total outstanding).  Justice Kennedy should have one of the three left in March (my hunch is Lee on the impact of immigration consequences on the validity of a plea).  Justice Alito already has two from March and one from April and — assuming that the projections regarding December through February are accurate — should have no case from either month.  If Justice Sotomayor is one of the (one or two) justices with seven opinions, she has already issued seven opinions.   Of the remaining six Justices (other than Justice Gorsuch), Chief Justice Roberts is likely to have two outstanding opinions with one being from April (my hunch is that one of the two is Trinity Lutheran on the free exercise and whether states have to provide funding to churches for secular purposes).  Besides his March opinion, Justice Kennedy should have an April opinion and an extra opinion in either March or April.  Justice Thomas has already issued six opinions (which would be seven with the expected January opinion) but could have one more opinion from March or April (looking at what’s left, the issue of what qualifies as a material misrepresentation in citizenship applications could be the case assigned to Justice Thomas).   Justice Ginsburg is at seven opinions, but could have one more from either March or April.  Justice Breyer should have two opinions left — at least one from April.  Justice Kagan should have one opinion in April (which would take her to seven opinions for the term and, for the reasons noted above, as the most junior of the justices who sat for the entire term, is most likely to only have seven opinions).

Some of the cases involve poltically-explosive issues like immigration and international relations.  Assuming that Justice Gorsuch does not have any additional opinions, the four Democratic justices are likely to have only five of the cases compared to twelve for the Republican justices.  If Justice Gorsuch does have an additional opinion, that allocation would be four and thirteen.

 

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Birth Citizenship — Supreme Court sends issue back to Congress

There are two ways that a person can be a natural born U.S. citizen.  First, under the Fourteenth Amendment, they can be born in the U.S.  Second, they can be born to U.S. citizens.  For this second category, Congress has established some conditions that must be met related to how long the U.S. citizen parent has resided in the U.S.

Looking at this second categories, there are eight possible combinations of three crucial factors — is the mother a U.S. citizen; is the father a U.S. citizen; and are the parents married.  (Actually, there are six, if neither parent is a U.S. citizen, the child can’t inherit citizenship from her parents.)  Having six different combinations in which at least one parent is a U.S. citizen, Congress has enacted different rules based on which parent is a U.S. citizen.  In particular, an unwed U.S. citizen mother has to spend less time in the U.S. than an unwed citizen father or married couples in which one member is a U.S. citizen.  Earlier this week, the Supreme Court issued an opinion on the constitutionality of these rules.

The case involved a man facing deportation.  That man’s father was a U.S. citizen but had left the U.S. twenty days before meeting the statutory requirements for conveying citizenship to his children.  As such, even though the father had returned to the U.S. with his family (including the person seeking citizenship in this case), the man was not entitled to automatic citizenship and — because he had not sought naturalization — could be deported.

Finding that the distinction in the statute was based on gender-characteristics and that the justification for relying on gender characteristics depended on stereotypes about the role of men and women in raising their children, the Supreme Court held that the differences contained in immigration law violated the Equal Protection Clause.  However, because, the shorter period of time for unmarried U.S. citizen mothers was an exception to the rule that applied to married couples and unmarried U.S. citizen fathers, the Supreme Court held that the extended period of residence should be applied to both unmarried citizen fathers and unmarried citizen mothers and that Congress would have to act if it wants to change that period of residence.

So the issue now becomes whether Congress will act on this invitation.  In this day and age, there are a lot of U.S. citizens — whether in the military, working for the government, or working for a private company — who live abroad and would like their children to be citizens.  On the other hand, the demagogue-in-chief has done his best to smear immigrants.    It will be interesting to see if Congress will even hold hearings to examine this part of immigration law.

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